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This paper examines optimal trade policy in a two-period oligopoly model, with a home and a
foreign firm choosing capital and output. Demand uncertainty, resolved in period two, gives rise to a
trade-off between strategic commitment and flexibility in the firms’ investment decisions. Firms’
investment timing is endogenous and can be manipulated by the home government, which sets a
subsidy before firms decide when to invest. We show that when the government wishes to
manipulate investment timing, it will choose its policy to deter investment commitment by the home
or the foreign firm.
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1. Introduction
The vast majority of investment decisions share three characteristics. Firstly, they are
carried out under uncertainty about future economic conditions. Secondly, the investment,
once it has taken place, is at least partly irreversible. Thirdly, the actual timing of the
investment is crucial. These three features of investment shape policy both in a micro- and
a macroeconomic setting.0022-1996/$ - see front matter D 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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stresses the strategic importance of investment irreversibility. Firms commit early to
capital, capacity or R&D with the aim of influencing the future course of the game. In
these models, it is typically assumed that firms do not face uncertainty about future
demand when choosing their investment level. However, with uncertainty, it is clear that
strategically motivated investment commitment by rival firms implies the loss of flexibility
required for adjusting to unexpected demand changes. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) have
stressed the importance of investment flexibility for a wide range of economic applica-
tions. In contrast to the literature on strategic commitment, their option approach to
investment emphasises the value of delaying investment until (at least part of) the
uncertainty has been resolved.
It is easy to make the case that strategic commitment and flexibility play a key role
in real-world investment decisions. Different trading blocs often fight for leadership in
key industries, especially in newly emerging markets such as Southeast Asian
economies and the reformed economies of Central and Eastern Europe. While early
investment, fuelling an aggressive exporting approach to these markets, may allow the
leading exporter to capture high rents, it also carries the risk of being overambitious.
This is particularly true for many developing regions where the macroeconomic climate
is unstable. To address this issue, this paper examines the trade-off between investment
flexibility and strategic commitment from the points of view of both firms and policy
makers.
From the perspective of firms, a choice needs to be made between investing early and
retaining the flexibility to cope with demand fluctuations. Retention of flexibility may,
however, imply the surrender of a first-mover advantage2. Spencer and Brander (1992)
consider the trade-off between commitment and delay from the point of view of firms but
their model does not address government policy.
From the perspective of policy-makers, firms may invest too early or too late. More
specifically, in our model a government that can affect investment timing chooses its
optimal policy in a strategic setting with uncertainty. In particular, governments with
commitment power may wish to encourage or discourage investment commitment by
firms. The question we address is quite different from the one raised in Arvan (1991). He
studies the commitment-flexibility trade-off from the point of view of governments that
choose when—before or after the resolution of uncertainty—to set their subsidy.
Moreover, in his set-up, unlike in our model, firms do not invest.
We use a dynamic oligopoly model in which a home and a foreign firm invest in capital
and export to a third market, and the home government chooses its trade policy3. We2 The question of when to invest naturally gives rise to endogenous timing in the investment game. Since the
1980s there has been considerable interest in the issue of endogenous timing in the choice of strategic variables in
oligopolistic markets. See, for instance, Gal-Or (1985), Dowrick (1986), Boyer and Moreaux (1987), Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990).
3 The key early papers on trade policy towards exporting oligopolists without capital investment include
Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986). Spencer and Brander (1983) examine a model
similar to these that includes an investment stage. Brander (1995) provides a comprehensive survey of this
literature.
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influence the game played by firms4,5. We explore how a government with commitment
power affects the firms’ strategic investment decisions for an export market where demand
uncertainty prevails. In our model there are two periods, during the first of which players
face uncertainty about future demand in the export market. In period two, when actual
outputs are chosen, uncertainty disappears6.
We show that governments can, and may wish to, alter the relative advantages of
investment flexibility to the home firm and its foreign rival. This involves intervention to
strategically manipulate the timing of home or foreign investment. The government can
force the foreign firm to remain flexible or persuade the home firm to avoid commitment.
This policy will be referred to as ‘‘Commitment deterrence’’. The possibility of ‘‘Com-
mitment inducement’’—manipulating the domestic firm or its rival to enforce early
investment—is also explored.
In Section 2 we describe the basic model in which a home and a foreign firm choose the
timing and level of their investment and export to a third market characterised by demand
uncertainty. In Section 3, we derive the optimal export policy of the home government.
Section 4 deals with a number of extensions of the analysis. The final section concludes
and suggests future research directions.2. The model
Consider a home and a foreign firm which are competing a` la Cournot in a third market,
facing demand uncertainty. The stochastic demand component is denoted by u, defined
over the closed interval u; u¯½  and characterised by a zero mean (Eu ¼ 0) and variance of
r2: Demand is given by:
p ¼ a Qþ u ð1Þ
where p is the price prevailing in the export market, Q ¼ xþ y is total output, and x and y
denote output of the home and foreign firm, respectively. Firms also invest in capital,4 Although the WTO Subsidy-Code prohibits the use of export subsidies, most countries
surreptitiously use forms of export subsidisation. The public provision of cheap loans to finance export
activities (e.g., export credits) is one example through which significant subsidies were channelled
indirectly to exporters in the late 1980s and 1990s (Stephens, 1999), especially to firms targeting newly
emerging markets.
5 Expanding the number of policy instruments increases the model’s complexity without yielding
additional insights. The model we discuss here is similar in structure to Grossman and Maggi (1998) in
which firms choose capital and output and the government chooses an export subsidy. Goldberg (1995)
and Karp and Perloff (1995) adopt a similar approach. In Neary and O’Sullivan (1999) the firms choose
R&D and output while the government chooses an export subsidy. Like these papers we do not discuss
the first-best policy, which entails a mix of investment and export subsidies. For a comprehensive
discussion of first-best versus second-best cases without uncertainty and endogenous timing, see Neary and
Leahy (2000).
6 This temporal structure is similar to that in Cooper and Riezman (1989) and Arvan (1991).
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the firms’ total cost functions (TC, TC*) are:
TC ¼ c0  kð Þxþ k
2
2g
ð2aÞ
TC* ¼ c0* k*
 
yþ k*
2
2g
ð2bÞ
where c0 and c0* are constants; c0  k and c0* k* represent the marginal cost of production
for the home and the foreign firm, respectively. The capital cost for each firm is captured
by the second terms in Eqs. (2a) and (2b); g is a constant, which is assumed to be identical
for both firms7.
There are two periods, during the first of which players face uncertainty about future
demand in the export market. At the start of period two, in which the actual output is
chosen, uncertainty disappears. Firms have the option to commit strategically to invest-
ment in period one. However, since this choice implies foregoing capital flexibility in the
second period, commitment is less appealing at high levels of uncertainty. If investment is
delayed until period two, capital is chosen simultaneously with output and optimally for
the demand then prevailing.
The model we use is a two-period four-stage game, which is depicted in Fig. 1. In stage
one, the home government sets an export subsidy. In stage two, firms decide whether to
invest in period one or two and are then committed to this decision. Home firm
commitment is represented by C, while D stands for delay; C* and D* represent
commitment and delay for the foreign firm. In stage three, firms that are committed to
invest in period one choose their actual capital level. This investment decision is
irreversible. In stage four, firms choose outputs simultaneously and firms that have not
yet chosen their capital do so8.
For simplicity, players are assumed to be risk neutral9. Profits for the home and foreign
firm are given by:
p ¼ pþ sð Þx TC ð3aÞ
p* ¼ py TC* ð3bÞ7 Grossman and Maggi (1998) use the same cost specification. It is also commonly used in the process R&D
literature (see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988).
8 In the terminology of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), the game we examine here is one with ‘‘Observable
delay’’. In a model without policy, Dewit and Leahy (2001) also consider an alternative game structure in which
the firms cannot simply commit to a timing of investment. Instead, a firm can only choose its capital early by
selecting the level of first-period capital investment to which it is then committed. Hamilton and Slutsky refer to
this type of extended game as one with ‘‘Action commitment’’. They examine and compare extended games of
observable delay and action commitment in simple output and price games without prior capital investment or
uncertainty.
9 Risk aversion raises the range of uncertainty over which flexibility is preferred to commitment and
complicates the analysis significantly, but without changing the qualitative nature of our results.
Fig. 1. The sequence of moves in the game.
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start by solving the final stage of the game. When choosing outputs in the last stage, firms
maximise second-period profits. Optimal outputs for the home and the foreign firm are,
respectively given by:
x ¼ ð2A A*þ 2sþ 2k  k*þ uÞ=3 ð4aÞ
y ¼ ð2A* A sþ 2k* k þ uÞ=3 ð4bÞ
We define Aua c0 , A*ua c0* . Initially, we assume firms’ costs are the same
(A ¼ A*). The implications of relaxing this assumption are discussed in Section 4.
Table 1 reports the optimal capital levels for the different investment timing combi-
nations. The first superscript on the variables refers to commitment (c) or delay (d) by the
home firm, while the second superscript denotes commitment (c*) or delay (d*) by the
foreign firm. A firm can increase its output flexibility by delaying its investment until
uncertainty is resolved. Firms that delayed investment choose investment levels in the last
stage, maximising second-period profits with respect to capital. This implies that capital is
a function of the actual demand realisation, u [see kdd*ðuÞ, k*dd*ðuÞ, kdc*ðuÞ and k*cd*ðuÞ
in Table 1]. Firms that opted for capital commitment have fixed their investment levels
earlier. More specifically, they determine optimal investment levels in stage three by
maximising expected profits with respect to capital. With commitment, capital no longer
depends on u [see kcc*, k*cc*, kcd* and k*dc* in Table 1]. Looking again at expressions (4a)
and (4b) together with the expressions in Table 1, we see that flexibility in a firm’s own
investment reinforces the effect of u on its output. Hence, a firm’s investment flexibility
enhances its output flexibility.
However, because investment flexibility implies that capital is chosen simultaneously
with output, it precludes strategic investment. Instead, investment is chosen to minimise
cost (k ¼ gx). When both firms commit, each firm strategically over-invests compared toTable 1
Optimal capital levels for the different investment timing combinations
C;C* C;D* D;C* D;D*
k kcc* ¼ 4
3
gExcc* kcd* ¼ 2 2gð Þ
32g gEx
cd* kdc*ðuÞ ¼ gxdc*ðuÞ kdd*ðuÞ ¼ gxdd*ðuÞ
k* k*
cc* ¼ 4
3
gEycc* k*cd*ðuÞ ¼ gycd*ðuÞ k*dc* ¼ 2 2gð Þ
32g gEy
dc* k*dd*ðuÞ ¼ gydd*ðuÞ
Table 2
Maximised expected profits for the different investment timing combinations
C;C* C;D* D;C* D;D*
Ep c Excc*
 2
þ 1
9
r2 f Excd*
 2
þ 1g
32g
 2
r2 u Exdc*
 2
þ 1g=2
32gð Þ2 r
2 u Exdd*
 2
þ 1g=2
3gð Þ2 r
2
Ep* c Eycc*
 2
þ 1
9
r2 u Eycd*
 2
þ 1g=2
32gð Þ2 r
2 f Eydc*
 2
þ 1g
32g
 2
r2 u Eydd*
 2
þ 1g=2
3gð Þ2 r
2
With cu1 8=9ð Þg, fu1 2g ð2 gÞ=ð3 2gÞ½ 2 and uu1 g=2.
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firm commits, that firm’s incentive to strategically over-invest increases: the higher
investment level now reduces the rival’s future output and future capital level. Thus, a
firm that commits while its rival delays will choose its investment in the most strategically
aggressive manner and will gain the highest possible strategic advantage. From Table 1,
we have the following capital-output ranking: kcd*=Excd* > kcc*=Excc* > kdc*=xdc* ¼
kdd*=xdd*.
In stage two, firms decide whether to invest early or later, choosing the timing that
yields the highest expected profits. Since expected profits increase in output flexibility,
firms will only commit to capital if this choice generates strategic gains that are
sufficiently large to compensate for the losses suffered by foregoing flexibility10. Table
2 gives maximised expected profits for the different investment timing combinations.
The export subsidy, set by the home government in stage one, has the usual effects of
an expansion in home output and a reduction in foreign output. In addition, it can also
affect firms’ investment timing. The subsidy increases the relative attractiveness of
commitment to the home firm, and lowers it to the foreign firm. Capital commitment
raises a firm’s output. Since the subsidy widens the home firm’s price–cost gap, it raises
the return to the output expansion that results from capital commitment. Conversely, for
the foreign firm, the subsidy narrows the price–cost gap (as home output increases, the
price falls), therefore reducing the return to investment commitment. We will show that
these subsidy-induced effects on investment timing are important in determining the
government’s optimal subsidy policy.3. Optimal trade policy and ‘‘commitment deterrence’’
In stage one, the government sets the subsidy to maximise expected welfare, EW, given
by:
EW ¼ Ep  sEx ð5Þ10 Because x and y depend linearly on u (see expressions (4a) and (4b)), profits are convex in u, implying that
expected profits increase in the variance of u. Due to the indirect effect of capital on output, the effect of the
variance on expected profits is larger under investment flexibility than with commitment. This generates the trade-
off between flexibility and commitment in our model. Our model thus captures the stylised fact that, ceteris
paribus, investors prefer projects that allow flexibility to those that require investing in capital that is irrevocably
fixed. Arvan (1991) and Spencer and Brander (1992) use a similar approach.
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in Section 2—it can also affect firms’ investment timing. For each possible investment
timing combination, there is an optimal rent-shifting subsidy. (These are reported in Table
A.1 of Appendix A). However, because the subsidy alters the relative advantage of
investment flexibility for firms, the government can and may wish to induce a change in
firms’ investment timing. To do so requires deviating from the optimal rent-shifting policy.
It will choose to do so if the policy of timing manipulation (which is suboptimal in terms
of rent-shifting) yields a higher expected welfare level than a policy of optimal rent-
shifting (which leaves firms’ investment timing unaltered).
Timing manipulation complicates the analysis considerably. So, before turning to the
game in which both firms’ investment timing is endogenous, it proves useful to explore the
policy maker’s problem by studying four simplified cases, henceforth referred to as cases I
to IV. In each case, only one firm chooses either to invest early or to delay while the
investment timing of its rival is exogenous. More specifically, we discuss the home
government’s optimal policy (i) when only the home firm chooses its investment timing
assuming that the foreign firm delays its investment (case I) and (ii) assuming, alternatively,
that the foreign firm invests early (case II). Subsequently, the optimal export subsidy is
derived (iii) when only the foreign firm chooses when to invest, assuming that the home firm
delays (case III) and (iv) assuming, alternatively, that the home firm commits (case IV). The
insights that emerge from these cases are helpful in understanding the government’s optimal
export subsidy in the game in which both firms’ investment timing choices are endogenous.
Since the analysis involves many unwieldy algebraic expressions, diagrams are
extensively used to ease the exposition. This approach allows us to minimise the number
of equations we give in the text, but does not reduce the generality of our analysis in any
way. In the figures, A is normalised at unity without loss of generality.
3.1. Only one firm chooses investment timing: four cases
3.1.1. Case I: Home firm chooses timing given exogenous foreign delay
This case is shown in Fig. 2, which depicts the relationship between the level of
uncertainty (r2) and the export subsidy (s) for a given level of g12. Here, given exogenous
foreign delay, ðC;D*Þ and ðD;D*Þ are the two possible investment timing combinations.
The policy active home government wants its own firm to delay its investment: delay
allows home investment to adjust to unexpected demand shocks and, in addition, avoids
the social costs associated with strategic over-investment. In fact, from a welfare
perspective, the home government’s ability to exploit its first-mover advantage eliminates
the need for the home firm to move first, though the firm may still desire to do so. The
same reasoning implies that it is never optimal to induce the home firm to commit when it
would have chosen to delay.
When uncertainty is high (r2zr2h), the home firm’s valuation of flexibility relative to
commitment is high. The government sets the subsidy sdd*; which is the optimal rent-11 See Brander (1995).
12 Varying the levels of g does not change the qualitative relationship between uncertainty and the export
subsidy (see Section 3.2).
Fig. 2. Optimal subsidisation given foreign firm delay (A=A*=1; g=0.03).
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to commit at sdd*. The government can only prevent this by setting a lower subsidy, thus
reducing the firm’s incentive to commit. We refer to this strategy as ‘‘Commitment
deterrence’’. The subsidy std* is the highest subsidy consistent with home delay, given
foreign delay. It increases in the level of uncertainty. As uncertainty falls, the firm values
flexibility less and therefore a lower subsidy is required to force the firm to delay. While
commitment deterrence forces the home firm to delay—which raises welfare—it also
implies deviating from the optimal rent-shifting subsidy for ðD;D*Þ, and thus involves a
welfare cost. This cost is larger as uncertainty falls, since then the deviation of std* from
sdd* becomes greater. However, provided that uncertainty is sufficiently high, the
difference between std* and sdd* remains relatively small, and the lost rent-shifting
associated with commitment deterrence is dominated by flexibility benefits. So, at
intermediate levels of uncertainty (r2l < r
2 < r2h ), the government deters commitment
by its home firm by setting the subsidy std*:
At low levels of uncertainty (r2 V r2l ), commitment deterrence requires too large of a
departure from the optimal rent-shifting subsidy. A less costly policy then entails accepting
home firm commitment and choosing scd*, which is the optimal rent-shifting subsidy
for ðC;D*Þ. We refer to this latter policy as one of ‘‘timing accommodation’’. Formally,
EW ðscd*;C;D*ÞzEW ðstd*;D;D*Þ at r2 V r2l .
3.1.2. Case II: Home firm chooses timing given exogenous foreign commitment
Now, the two possible timing combinations are ðD;C*Þ and ðC;C*Þ. The policy in this
case closely resembles that in the previous case. The home government will accommodate
home commitment when uncertainty is low, and thus chooses the subsidy scc*; the optimal
rent-shifting subsidy for ðC;C*Þ. The main difference from the previous case is that the
foreign firm now invests strategically. Moreover, its strategic behaviour is strongest in
ðD;C*Þ, that is, when it invests before the home firm. Thus, commitment by the home firm
has the beneficial effect of ‘‘softening’’ the strategic aggressiveness of the foreign firm
(k*cc*=Eycc* < k*dc*=Eydc*). This does not occur in case I (k*dd*=Eydd* ¼ k*cd*=Eycd*)
Fig. 3. Optimal subsidisation given home firm delay (A=A*=1; g=0.03).
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welfare perspective, home firm commitment now has a beneficial effect that needs to be
weighed against the negative welfare effects mentioned earlier. For this reason, the
government continues to accommodate home commitment at higher levels of uncertainty
than in case I13. However, when uncertainty is sufficiently high, it prefers, for the same
reasons as in case I, to deter home commitment with a discrete cut in the subsidy to stc*(the
highest subsidy consistent with home delay, given foreign commitment). As uncertainty
increases further, stc* rises, eventually reaching sdc*; the optimal rent-shifting subsidy for
ðD;C*Þ. At and above that level of uncertainty, the firm willingly delays.
3.1.3. Case III: Foreign firm chooses timing given exogenous home delay
The two possible timing combinations are now ðD;D*Þ and ðD;C*Þ . The home
government would like the foreign firm to delay its investment so that it will not behave
strategically, setting a high investment level. Fig. 3 depicts the optimal subsidy at different
levels of uncertainty. At high uncertainty levels, the foreign firm chooses to delay at the
subsidy level sdd*, the optimal rent-shifting subsidy for ðD;D*Þ. Below a threshold level of
uncertainty (r 2
h*
), the home government can maintain foreign firm delay but only by
choosing the higher commitment deterrence subsidy given home delay, sdt*. As uncer-
tainty continues to fall and the attraction of commitment for the foreign firm increases,
commitment deterrence requires an ever greater departure from the optimal rent-shifting
subsidy for ðD;D*Þ and thus becomes increasingly costly. Eventually, for r2 V r2
l*
; the
government abandons commitment deterrence by choosing sdc*, and ðD;C*Þ emerges as
the equilibrium investment timing14.13 This beneficial effect is never sufficient to make the government choose to induce home commitment.
14 Inducing the foreign firm to commit is never an attractive option for the government, in spite of the
flexibility advantage to the home firm if it is the only one to delay. This flexibility gain would only outweigh the
second-mover disadvantage at very high levels of uncertainty, when flexibility is also very attractive to the foreign
firm. Hence, inducing foreign commitment would imply that the home firm would have to be very heavily taxed.
This is simply never optimal.
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As shown above, the government would prefer the foreign firm to delay. At high levels
of uncertainty, commitment deterrence is unnecessary: the ðC;D*Þ-equilibrium prevails
and the government chooses scd*: At intermediate levels of uncertainty, the government
deters foreign commitment by using the subsidy sct*, the lowest possible subsidy that
deters foreign commitment when the home firm commits. At very low levels of
uncertainty, the sct*-subsidy is so high that deterrence is too costly; the government then
chooses to accommodate foreign commitment with the subsidy scc*.
3.2. Both firms choose investment timing
Having analysed cases I to IV, we are now ready to consider the game described in Fig.
1 in which both firms’ investment timing decisions are endogenous. The outcome of the
game at different parameter values is presented in Fig. 4a and b. While Fig. 4a depicts the
optimal subsidy at different r2-levels keeping g constant, Fig. 4b represents the outcomes
in (r2; g)-space. As explained earlier, the government would wish both the home and the
foreign firm to delay investment but it would also like to set the subsidy as close as
possible to the optimal rent-shifting level for the timing equilibrium that emerges. In area I
in Fig. 4b, the government sets the subsidy scc*, the optimal rent-shifting subsidy for
ðC;C*Þ . The government accommodates the timing as commitment deterrence is very
costly in this region. This is because uncertainty is very low and thus the firms’ relative
valuation of commitment to flexibility is high.
As uncertainty rises firms’ relative valuation of commitment falls and commitment
deterrence becomes a feasible policy alternative. As we saw in Section 3.1, commitment
deterrence requires deviating from optimal rent-shifting subsidies. Fig. 4a and b show that,
as uncertainty rises, deterrence of foreign commitment occurs before deterrence of home
commitment. Intuitively, with subsidisation of the home firm (giving it a net cost
advantage), enforcing foreign firm flexibility is the easier option because commitment
has a lower value for the latter than it has for the home firm.
Moving from area I to area II in Fig. 4b implies that the government will switch from
accommodating commitment, (scc*; C, C*), to deterring foreign commitment, while
allowing the home firm to commit (sct*; C, D*). More precisely, this regime switch is
indicated by the locus on which deterrence and accommodation of foreign commitment
yield the same expected welfare: EW ðsct*;C;D*Þ ¼ EW ðscc*;C;C*Þ . In Fig. 4a, this
switch occurs at point e, at which the subsidy jumps discretely to a higher level. As the
level of uncertainty rises, the commitment deterrence subsidy sct* falls and approaches scd*
. Eventually, uncertainty is so high that sct* ¼ scd* (point f in Fig. 4a), which is the optimal
rent-shifting subsidy for ðC;D*Þ. This is indicated in Fig. 4b by the locus Ep*ðscd*;C;
C*Þ ¼ Ep*ðscd*;C;D*Þ . At intermediate levels of uncertainty (area III in Fig. 4b),
deterring the home firm from committing still proves too costly in welfare terms
[EW ðstd*;D;D*Þ < EW ðscd*;C;D*Þ]. Home commitment deterrence becomes sufficient-
ly attractive to the government when the maximum subsidy that enforces home firm
flexibility given foreign delay, std*, is high enough [EW ðstd*;D;D*Þ > EW ðscd*;C;D*Þ].
Hence, home commitment deterrence considerations shape the subsidy policy prevailing in
area IV in Fig. 4b. In Fig. 4a, the regime shift (at point g) is characterised by a discrete
Fig. 4. (a) Optimal subsidisation when both firms choose investment timing in (r2; s) (A=A*=1; g=0.03). (b)
Optimal subsidisation when both firms choose investment timing in (r2, g)-space (A=A*=1).
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flexibility of the home firm. For higher levels of uncertainty, this policy involves a subsidy
closer to the optimal rent-shifting subsidy when both firms remain flexible, sdd* .
Eventually, the commitment deterrence subsidy std* coincides with sdd* (point h in Fig.
4a). At and above the level of uncertainty at which std* ¼ sdd*; the government sets sdd*
and both firms delay (area V in Fig. 4b).4. Extensions
This section deals with a number of extensions of the model. We describe how cost
asymmetries between firms and the addition of more firms affect our results. We then
G. Dewit, D. Leahy / Journal of International Economics 64 (2004) 195–209206consider how the government’s optimal trade policy would change if firms compete in a
Bertrand rather than in a Cournot fashion. Finally, we briefly discuss a set-up in which the
government cannot commit long-term and must set its trade policy in period two after
uncertainty has been resolved.
4.1. Cost asymmetry
So far, we considered firms with symmetric costs in the sense that c0 ¼ c0*. With
cost asymmetry15, the results do not change qualitatively when the home firm has a
cost advantage (c0 < c0*). When the foreign firm has a cost advantage (c0 > c0*), the
results only change subtly when this cost advantage is sufficiently large to outweigh
the subsidy advantage of the home firm. Then, the relationship between the subsidy
and the level of uncertainty is similar to the one depicted in Fig. 4a, except that, as
uncertainty rises, deterring home commitment now occurs before deterring foreign
commitment. This is because, when the foreign firm has a larger price–cost gap, it
values commitment more than the home firm. Hence, unlike in the symmetric case,
enforcing home rather than foreign firm flexibility is now the easier option.
4.2. Multiple firms
With multiple home firms, the optimal subsidy level will be lower due to terms-of-trade
considerations16. However, the policy towards firms’ investment timing is not qualitatively
different. Like under Cournot duopoly, if the government wishes to manipulate firms’
investment timing, it will deter (i.e., never induce) commitment: it needs to reduce the
subsidy below its optimal rent-shifting level to deter its own firms, whereas a subsidy
increase is required for foreign commitment deterrence17.
4.3. Bertrand competition
Consider a modified version of the game described in Fig. 1, in which the home
and foreign firm choose prices rather than quantities in stage four, and sell
differentiated products18. In all other respects, the model remains unchanged. Under
Bertrand competition, the optimal export policy involves a tax instead of a subsidy19.
From a welfare perspective, the government’s ability to move first overrides the need
for the home firm to commit. Hence, when manipulation of the home firm’s timing is
optimal, it will involve commitment deterrence. It entails setting the tax above the tax15 For a detailed analysis of the effects of cost asymmetry in a strategic trade model, we refer to earlier work
(see, for instance, de Meza, 1986, and Neary, 1994).
16 Conversely, with more foreign firms, the subsidy tends to be higher (see Dixit, 1984).
17 With symmetric firms, multiple equilibria are likely. However, except for the occurrence of narrow bands
with multiple equilibria at some ranges of uncertainty, this would not yield a timing equilibria picture that is
qualitatively different from the one in Fig. 4b.
18 This standard assumption of product differentiation avoids the usual problem of the Bertrand paradox.
19 See Eaton and Grossman (1986). Bagwell and Staiger (1994) consider a model with investment and price
competition in which the government chooses an investment subsidy.
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uncertainty, the government may consider manipulating the foreign firm’s investment
timing, but, instead of deterring foreign commitment the government will now choose
to induce it by raising the export tax. Unlike in Cournot competition, the strategic
behaviour of the foreign firm benefits the home country because it involves strategic
under-investment to commit to a high price.
4.4. Policy flexibility
In the game we discussed, the government moves first, which presumes that it can
credibly commit to its policies long-term. This assumption about the commitment power
of the government could be contested, particularly in the context of developing
countries. Rodrik (1992) has distinguished between strong and weak states on the basis
of their commitment power. Suppose that the government cannot commit to its trade
policy long-term, that is, before the firms choose their timing. Instead, assume that the
subsidy is set in period two after uncertainty is resolved but before firms’ period-two
actions are chosen20. Since the subsidy in that set-up is chosen in line with actual
demand [s ¼ sðuÞ], it allows the government to exploit unexpected demand shocks in
favour of its own firm. However, it also has an important drawback: firms can now
influence the subsidy by investing strategically in period one. This encourages firms to
invest early. Early investment by the foreign firm in particular has harmful welfare
implications due to enhanced strategic aggressiveness in its choice of investment.
Furthermore, investment-timing manipulation is ruled out under this type of policy
regime. However, policy flexibility entails welfare gains when uncertainty is high and
firms choose to delay investment.5. Conclusion
In this paper we have examined optimal trade policy when the timing of firms’
investment decisions is endogenous and demand is uncertain. In our set-up, firms face a
trade-off between remaining flexible in order to adjust their capital appropriately in the
face of uncertain demand, or moving earlier in order to strategically manipulate their rival.
We have shown that endogenous timing of investment creates a new motive for
government intervention. The government, setting its subsidy at the beginning of the game
before firms decide when and how much to invest, may adjust its policy to affect the
investment timing decision of firms. In particular, it may choose to increase or decrease the
subsidy to deter private-sector capital commitment. If it chooses to deter foreign
commitment this necessitates increasing the export subsidy to reduce the relative
advantage of commitment to the foreign firm. By contrast, to deter home commitment
and thus guarantee flexible investment by the home firm, while preventing socially non-20 Of course, if the government has no commitment power at all and hence chooses the subsidy at the same
time firms determine outputs, strategic trade policy is impossible.
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would be employed if the government was only concerned with rent-shifting.
Before concluding we wish to point out some possible avenues for future research. In
this paper we have focussed on demand uncertainty. Firms may also be uncertain about
their own and rival’s future costs. In that case it would be natural to assume that they know
less about their rival’s costs than their own. This would raise the issue of asymmetric
information that we have assumed away here. Allowing for asymmetric information in the
analysis would lead to other interesting lines of research. Even with demand uncertainty
there may be cases in which one firm knows more than the other. We could, for instance,
consider a case in which one firm (with local knowledge) has better information about the
market demand. These issues are left as topics for future research.Acknowledgements
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Optimal rent-shifting subsidies for all possible investment timing combinations
scc*
1 4=9ð Þg 2 4=3ð Þg½ 
2 4=3ð Þg Ex
cc*
sdc* 32g
2 34gþg2½ Ex
dc*
scd*
32gð Þ22g 2gð Þ2
32gð Þ2 2gð Þ Ex
cd
sdd* Ex
dd*
2g
Note: sdc* > sdd* > scc* > scd* for A=A*.References
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